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A better title would be: 
Strategic culture and the impact of technology 
MAD – an unacceptable outcome 
The US has been utterly frustrated for being held hostage by a 'primitive' and 'antiquated' 
war-waging technology -  the nuclear/thermonuclear bomb; 
1. Rather short ownership of nuclear technology; 
2. Soviet Union matched the technology first nuclear, then thermonuclear in short periods of time; 
3. It essentially became a game of numbers  - quantity became a quality in itself 
'this concept of mutual homicide, sure and certain, has in many ways been peculiarly comforting to those holding it. It 
makes plausible the conviction that when governments are informed of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war they 
will realize there could be no victors. There would be no sense to such a war' - Hermann Khan - On Thermonuclear 
War  
 
The dawn of Clausewitzian logic  
Hedley Bull - Strategic Studies and its critics – 1968 
• the prospect of nuclear obliteration changed significantly strategic thinking as it was no longer the preserve of the military; 
• away from war as an instrument of policy toward the threat of war, and studies of actual violence have given place to analyses 
of "deterrence," "crisis management," "the manipulation of risk”; 
• the civilian strategists have entered the citadels of power and have prevailed over military advisers on major issues of policy; 
• anything 'strategic' inevitably became the work of theorists, able and willing to 'overwhelm the military with their quality and 
quantity of contributions to the literature'  
Leading to the development of game theory and, later on, to the concept of strategic culture 
Neither would deliver the US from the prospect of being at the mercy of its nuclear adversary 
The promise of technology -  
'classical' combat operations  
Stalemate conundrum was to be overturn by the new technologies - particularly computers and electronics - overwhelmingly an 
American enterprise 
the Strategic Defense Initiative aka the ‘Star Wars’ initiative by President Reagan in 1981 
Computer power allowing modelling, automation, task management and correction, aid to decision making, etc 
Defensive and offensive weapons and weapons support systems 
C4ISR - Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
EBO - Effects Based Operations, SoSA - System of Systems Analysis, ONA - Operational Net Assessment, SOD - 
Systemic Operational Design 
 
 
Strategic 
Defense 
Initiative 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
 
STRATCOM merged US SpaceCom 
Joint Functional Component 
Command for Global Strike JFCC-GS 
Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike  
JFCC-GS - five suggested scenarios 
is designed to optimize planning, execution and 
force management for the assigned missions of 
deterring attacks against the United States, its 
territories, possessions and bases 
provides integrated global strike capabilities to 
deter and dissuade threats and when directed, 
defeat adversaries through decisive joint global 
kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects. 
A near-peer competitor had used its emerging counter-space 
capability to destroy a U.S. satellite.   
The United States wanted to destroy a package of special nuclear 
materials that a terrorist organization had shipped to a neutral 
country.   
A small package of weapons of mass destruction was located 
temporarily in a rural area of a neutral country.   
The leadership of a terrorist organization had gathered in a known 
location in a neutral country.   
A rogue state armed with a nuclear weapon was threatening to use 
that weapon against a U.S. ally. * 
Operationalization of Strategy 
Strategy is driven by what can be technologically 
achieved 
As such strategy no longer bears the attribute of political 
reason - slowly becomes enslaved by marketers that 
advertise technological prowess with little regard to 
actual strategic objectives  
Game theory seemed too simplistic so by introducing an 
indefinite number of variables (attack vectors), which are 
devised and controlled by integrated systemic models, 
one must tilt the balance in their favour.  
 
'the Army has no wish to scrap its previous experience 
in favor of unproven doctrine, or in order to 
accommodate enthusiastic theorists having little or no 
responsibility for the consequences of following the 
courses of action they advocate’   
General Matthew B. Ridgeway - 1955  
 
The promise of 
technology 
'The Prompt Global Strike concept is 
meant to sustain the US monopoly in 
the military sphere and to widen the 
gap between it and the rest of the 
world. Combined with the deployment 
of missile defense supposed to keep 
the US immune to retaliatory strikes 
from Russia and China...' 
'In essence, the new US nuclear 
doctrine is an element of the novel US 
security strategy that would be more 
adequately described as the strategy 
of total impunity...' 
Rick Rozoff 
The non-nuclear arsenal used for disabling and destroying the air defenses 
and strategic, potentially all major, military forces of other nations will 
consist of intercontinental ballistic missiles, adapted submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles and bombers, and super 
stealthy strategic bombers able to avoid detection by radar and thus evade 
ground- and air-based defenses. 
 
Any short-range, intermediate-range and long-range missiles remaining in 
the targeted country will in theory be destroyed after launching by kinetic, 
“hit-to-kill” interceptor missiles. Should the missiles so neutralized contain 
nuclear warheads, the fallout will occur over the country that launches them 
or over an adjoining body of water or other nation of the U.S.’s choosing. 
 
Comparison of the GDP’s   
USA 
1980 - 2,862.5 US$ (bln.) 
2014 - 17,408.19 US$ (bln.) 
% of the world economy 
22.53% 
After a nuclear war 
2-5%? 
USSR/Russia 
1980 - 940 US$ (bln.) 
2014 - 1,857.5 US$ (bln.) 
% of the world economy 
2.40% 
After a nuclear war 
.5%? 
Absorption capacity  
in a nuclear exchange - nuclear war that has been won   
The ability to maintain a reasonable level of government 
after a nuclear counter-strike either counter-value or 
counter-force or both. 
Ability to defend any allies that are subject to a 
conventional attack in the aftermath  
Ability to recover in terms of military-industrial capacity 
and re-engage to maintain a dominant position. 
Ability to recover a dominant position and the timespan 
to do so. 
If a hybrid or nuclear exchange can be won it suggests 
US adversaries will alter their strategy to check all (and 
more) of the post conflict absorption capacity indices - 
military-industrial capacities, carrier battle groups, 
satellites etc. 
If this strategy succeeds, the US will most likely lose its 
primacy position for the long term. 
May trigger further attacks from challengers willing to fill 
in that primacy position  
MAD 
replaced by 
PAD? 
Primacy Assured Destruction 
US primacy replaced by 
Germany, China, Japan…? 
'Russian fascination with game theory stems partially from the well-known Soviet propensity to 
look for technical solutions to non-technical problems. The same tendency is evident in the 
Russian exuberance over the benefits that computerization and cybernetization are supposed 
to hold for Soviet society' 
Thomas W. Robinson, Game Theory and Politics: Recent Soviet Views (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1970) 
New computer models and analyses ought to take into account not only how 
to defeat an adversary but how to preserve, at least in part, the real asset of 
American Grand Strategy which is primacy not military supremacy. 
Military supremacy is unsustainable without primacy. 
 
Extreme reliance on technological breakthroughs is counterproductive 
especially if tries to adjust or alter strategic objectives.  
 
'Technology is a poor substitute for strategic thinking'  - Colin Gray 
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